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I
WE are a nation of pragmatists. In our history--narked as it is by rapid
change-new problems requiring governmental action have constantly arisen.
As Congress -has moved to meet these problems, solutions have been shaped
in terms of practical responses to felt needs rather than by rigid adherence to
philosophical criteria, abstract theory, or detailed organizational charts. No
segment of governmental activity more clearly illustrates this shaping of prac-
tical solutions to felt needs than the history of the enforcement of our anti-
trust laws.
The current pattern of dual responsibility for enforcement vested in the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission arose because of a
realization that judicial enforcement of hard-core Sherman Act offenses was
insufficient to prevent trends toward restriction of trade and monopoly. In
1912, all three political parties (Democratic, Republican and Progressive)
called for the creation of an administrative agency empowered to reach mo-
nopolistic tendencies and unfair trade practices in their incipiency. The crea-
tion of the FTC was the response to this felt need. The forty-five years that
-have since passed have amply demonstrated the efficacy of this dual pattern
of enforcement, despite the fact that this arrangement may offend those who
subscribe to the principle that neat theorems rather than practical considera-
tions should determine the distribution of governmental functions.
The role of the FTC in this system of dual enforcement is once again under
attack. Or perhaps I should say that this role has been continuously under
attack. The -historical pattern of opposition to all governmental regulation by
administrative agencies has taken the following form: Opponents of govern-
ment regulation characteristically first attack the principle of regulation. This
battle having been lost, the attack shifts to an assault upon the regulators, and
if the second battle is lost, a more subtle campaign is then conducted to cap-
ture the regulators. With one or two isolated examples of ineptitude or moral
failure, the cry then goes up for "reforms" that would abolish regulation. The
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history of the administrative agencies is replete with illustrations of this pat-
tern.1
I need not belabor the reader with a list of the theoretical objections to the
enforcement of national policy ,by an administrative agency that have been
advanced in the past. I merely note that these criticisms have been raised
strenuously and continuously. In recent years the proponents of these objec-
tions ,have capped their arguments with the proposition that FTC adjudicatory
functions should be exercised by an administrative court. This proposal re-
ceived support in the reports of a task force of the Second Hoover Commis-
sion in 1955 2 and the American Bar Association committee of fifteen in
1956.3 I have argued against this proposal in many forums.4 I have urged
these points on all who paused to listen and consider:
1. See GELLHORN & BYsE, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW-CASES 27-59 (1954).
The late Justice Robert H. Jackson, an astute observer of the administrative process,
who, because of 'his long government career was aware of the shortcomings as well as the
benefits of the administrative process and was often sharply critical of it, placed the prob-
lem in proper perspective when he stated at the time he was Solicitor General:
From the very beginning the administrative tribunal has faced the hostility of
the legal profession ....
The administrative tribunal ... is often penetrating into new fields where prec-
edents do not exist. Its concern is with the future more than with the past, and it
counts the probable progeny of its decisions as of more importance than their an-
cestry...
Those who dislike such activities of the government as regulation of the utility
holding companies, of labor relations, or of the marketing of securities, rightly con-
ceive that if they can destroy the administrative tribunal which enforces regulation,
they would destroy the whole plan of regulation itself.
Jackson, The Administrative Process, 5 J. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 143, 146-47 (1940).
2. 1 U.S. COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GoVERNMiENr,
TASK FORCE REiORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES recommendations Nos. 63.64,
at 246-55 (1955) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
The Hoover Commission itself did not support the Task Force recommendations. In
its recommendation No. 50 it stated: "Congress should look into the feasibility of tranls-
ferring to the courts certain judicial functions ... ." 1 U.S. COMII'N ON ORGANIZATION 0i,
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCE-
DURE 85 (1955). (Emphasis added.) Recommendation No. 51 stated: "An Administrative
Court of the United States should be established . . ." with a Tax Section, a Trade Sec-
tion, and a Labor Section, but "it is further recommended that the Congress should study
and determine whether the Trade Section and the Labor Section ... should have original
or appellate jurisdiction." 1 id. at 87-88. (Emphasis added.) Actually, only six of the
twelve 'Commission members "fully support" those uncertain recommendations. I id. at 95.
3. See SPECIAL COMm. ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE, ABA, REPORT TO THE
1956 MIDYEAR MEETING OF THE: Houss OF DELEGATES (1956). The administrative court
proposal was subsequently adopted by the House of Delegates. See Sellers, A New Legis-
lative Program of the Association, 42 A.B.A.J. 637 (1956).
4. See, e.g., Kintner, The Trade Court Proposal: An Examination of Some Possible
Defects, 44 A.B.A.J. 441 (1958). See also Kintner, A Government Lawyer Comments
on the Davis Treatise, 43 MINN. L. REV. 620 (1959).
A number of students of the administrative process have vigorously criticized the
administrative court proposal. See Freer, The Case Against the Trade Regulation Section
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1. That the proposal for an administrative court is bottomed on rigid
conceptualism rather than on empirical, unbiased analysis;
2. That the proponents of an administrative court have not engaged in
detailed study of the performance of existing agencies and have failed
to document their charges against the independent agencies; and
3. That the burden of proof properly rests upon the proponents of
change.
These three propositions are still valid, but the attack on the administrative
process now comes from a new quarter, and new defenses must be devised.
This new attack has been much in the news in the last few months. The
speech of Mr. Louis J. Hector before the Section of Administrative Law of
the American Bar Association 5 and his memorandum to the President sub-
mitted at the time of his resignation from the Civil Aeronautics Board 0 con-
stitute the most detailed exposition of this "new criticism."
II
One of the most provocative aspects of the "new criticism," as given ex-
pression -by Mr. Hector, is that it purports to abandon the attack on govern-
mental regulation of business as such, and to decline to inveigh against the
"headless fourth branch of government" because it offends the pristine concept
of separation of powers. The basic contention is that the administrative agen-
cies simply do not do the job assigned to them.
Mr. Hector arrives at this conclusion through a process of inductive reason-
ing. He begins by alleging certain specific horrible examples of administrative
inefficiency which occurred during his two-year tenure as a member of the
CAB. He then argues that these examples are typical of all CAB procedures
and concludes by contending that these examples of ineptitude are common
wherever the administrative process is employed. Inductive reasoning can be
a seductive process. Its self-contained logic is smooth and round. The difficulty
with such reasoning is that it may wither when the assumptions contained
within it are subjected to comparison with a larger experience.
Thomas Reed Powell once said, "I can win any argument if you allow me
to state the question." One of the sharpest difficulties facing those who oppose
the dismemberment of the administrative process is that the proponents of
abolition -have not only seized the initiative in stating the question, but, hay-
of the Proposed Administrative Court, 24 Gm. WAsH. L REv. 637 1(1956); Fuchs, The
Hoover Comnission and Task Force Reports on Legal Services and Procedure, 31 Ixo.
LJ. 1 (1955) ; Nutting, The Adnnistrative Court, 30 N.Y.U.L RM. 1384 (1955) ; Jaffe,
Basic Isses: An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1273 (1955). See also Arpaia, The Inde-
pendent Agency-A Necessary Instrument of Denocratic Government, 69 HIv. L RE%.
483 (1956).
5. Hector, The New Critique of the Regulatory Agency, Remarks Before the Section
of Administrative Law, ABA, Iiami, Florida, Aug. 25, 1959 (mimeographed).
6. Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69
YALE L.. 931 (1960).
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ing reached an a priori conclusion, have gone on to select a method of anal-
ysis to prove it.
Even if we accept the averments of the "new critics" that they accept the
necessity of limited governmental regulation of business, and even if we yield
to the seductive blandishments of inductive reasoning, there are still basic
flaws in the concepts and methods of analysis of the "new criticism." These
flaws must be exposed before a constructive examination of the administrative
process can be conducted.
The "new criticism" begins with a 'basic comparison. This comparison is
between the independent agencies as now organized and operated and the
order of things that would obtain if the agencies were abolished and their
policymaking functions were assigned to the Executive Branch and their ad-
judicatory functions were assigned to an administrative court. This basic com-
parison, then, has the present reality at one pole.and a vision of Utopia at the
other. The flaw is readily apparent. The picture drawn by the "new critics"
does not allow for the possibility that the administrative process can be im-
proved 'beyond its present state. I have never believed that the status quo is
the best of all possible worlds. I have continually maintained that all rea-
sonable proposals for improvement in the administrative process should be
adopted. The Commission that I represent has continually striven to honor
not only the letter but the spirit of legislative improvements to the process,
and has examined and reexamined its own practices and procedures to un-
cover defects and to remedy them. We invite the aid of all informed and ex-
perienced groups in this vital task. But I maintain that if, as the "new critics"
say, the sole question is how to accomplish governmental regulation of busi-
ness in the most effective and least burdensome manner, and if pragmatism
rather than adherence to philosophical criteria is to be the guide in this under-
taking, then the administrative process itself should not 'be abandoned for an
untested utopian alternative until it can be demonstrated that the administra-
tive process would 'be ineffective even if improved to the limit of its capabil-
ities. The true basic comparison should be 'between the administrative process
as it can be improved and the proposals of the "new critics."
After the proper comparison is established, a rational method of analysis
must 'be devised; and the first imperative must be the need for particulariza-
tion of study and criticism. I have said that the process of inductive reason-
ing is a seductive one. But we lawyers know the danger of yielding unre-
servedly to its 'blandishments. Each administrative agency must be studied in
the context of its own functions and procedures. I need not mention that there
are radical differences between the work of the FTC and the 'CAB or the
work of the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Communications
Commission. Any generalization based on the assumption that all these agen-
cies are alike for all purposes is a dangerous one, very likely to be false.
A necessary first step in the task of testing 'proposals for the improvement
or abolition of the administrative process must be a careful, unbiased study to
discover real, not imagined, defects in the functioning of the administrative
[Vol. 69: 965
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agencies as they are now constituted. At first this may seem to be a call to
pour old wine into new bottles. But, may I remind you that the last detailed
study of the functioning of each administrative agency was conducted by the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in 1941. 7 The
proposal of the Second Hoover Commission Task Force for the establishment
of a trade court was premised on the sketchiest of studies.8 Any proposal for
sweeping change must demonstrate the actual need for such a change by reve-
lation of defects that would be cured by such a change.
Second, it must be determined whether the defects uncovered by such a
study can be remedied by improving the procedures of the existing adminis-
trative agencies. Obviously, radical major surgery is not called for when a
simple dose of medicine can effect a cure.
Third, if any real defects would remain even after the present system is
improved to the limit of its capabilities, it must be determined whether aban-
donment of the present system and adoption of the proposed alternative would
eliminate these net defects.
Fourth, it must be determined whether the proposed alternative, in this in-
stance an administrative court, would be free of the defects that could be
eliminated by improvement of the present system.
Fifth, it must be determined whether the proposed alternative would con-
tain within it defects not to be found in the present system as improved. I am
7. U.S. Attorney General's Comm. on Administrative Procedure, Final Report-
Admninistrative Procedure in Government Agendes, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Is Sees.
(1941). The Committee selected twenty-eight departments, boards, commissions, and
agencies "which substantially affect persons outside the Government through the making
of rules and regulations or the adjudication of rights... *" Id. at 3. The Committee
assigned to a staff of lawyer-investigators the task of studying the procedure of these
agencies. The staff interviewed agency officials, members of the staffs of the agencie-,
and attorneys who practice before these agencies. Staff members attended proceedings,
read the records of cases, and examined administrative files. Upon the completion of
these studies, the staff prepared for the Committee a description of each agency's pro-
cedures. As each study was made available to the appropriate agency for its consideration.
the full Committee met for discussion of the study with agency officers. The reports of thc
staff, after final revision, were published in a series of twenty-seven monographs and
widely distributed.
It should be noted that the House Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight,
through its Advisory Council on Administrative Problems, is now conducting a study
of the procedures of six agencies (CAB, FCC, FPC, FTC, ICC, SEC) which gives
promise of a significant addition to the body of knowledge.
& The report was "based primarily" on material contained in a single questionnaire
sent to "the departments and independent establishments of the executive branch." The
entire survey was done "in a period of 10 months with the assistance of only a few pro-
fessional consultants and a small staff." 1 TAsK FoncE RnoRT 3, 4. The questionnaire
consisted of fourteen basic sections in the pattem of the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946. The first thirteen sections requested statements of functions and procedures; the
fourteenth section requested evaluation and recommendations from the reporting agency
itself. The questionnaire is contained in an unpublished mimeographed compilation. I id.
pt. VI (Appendixes and Charts).
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not so optimistic as to believe that any method of government devised 'by. man
can be totally free of flaws. If we are contemplating a choice, we must weigh
both the advantages and disadvantages of one choice against the advantages
and disadvantages of the other. A comparison between the disadvantages of
one choice and the advantages of the other is not a sound basis for decision.
Finally, we must assess the effects that adoption of the proposed alternative
would have on the branches of government outside the system studied. It is
obvious that abolition of administrative agencies would cause profound altera-
tion of the functioning of the Congress, the Executive, and the judiciary. Such
a change would also have untold consequences in the interrelationships of these
three. No drastic proposal for change should be adopted if too-heavy burdens
would be assigned to others or if delicately balanced relationships would be
disrupted.
I have stressed the need for particularization in study and analysis. I must
also stress the need for particularization in the proposal of "reforms." Any
proposal for change in the administrative process must be examined for adapt-
ability to all administrative agencies; what may be needed to improve the
efficiency of one agency or type of agency may actually impede the efficient
operation of other agencies.
III
Having submitted to the lawyerlike discipline of articulating a method of
analysis, let us now turn to an examination of some of the specific criticisms
of the administrative process raised by the "new critics." It should first be
reiterated that the defects in the administrative process identified by the "new
critics" have not been isolated as the result of comprehensive study, any more
than the defects identified by earlier proponents of the trade court idea were.
Second, the identification of any defect necessarily implies that a standard of
judgment is being employed. Such standards themselves should be open to
examination and question.
Specific criticisms should not and cannot be examined in a vacuum. There-
fore, we will consider them insofar as they may apply to the FTC.
First, do the FTC's procedure and organization preclude effective policy-
making?
The Commission performs its principal task of policy formulation by giving
specific content to the broad statutory prohibitions expressed in the Federal
Trade Commission Act 1) and the Clayton Act,10 as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act." This task cannot .be accomplished -by the formulation of rules
of general application outside the context of a specific case or by ex partc
enunciation of principles. Congress recognized this, since it is obvious that if
antitrust objectives could be accomplished in this manner Congress itself could
9. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1958).
10. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1958).
1M 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1958).
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have accomplished the task. The bare fact that Congress created the FTC
shows that the Congress realized that a flexible method of providing detailed
content for broad prohibitions was the only feasible one. Few statutory pro-
hibitions are as broad as that contained in section 5 (a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.'2 If the purpose of that statute is to be given effect, however,
there must be some device for adapting the statutory proscription to the myr-
iad devices that can be invented by the mind of man. Thus, specific standards
must necessarily be evolved in the context of specific cases. The forty-five
years of precedent contained in the Fedcral Trade Commission Rcports fur-
nishes a valuable exposition of policy. This body of precedent should not be
discarded lightly. Nor can it be assumed that the task of giving content to this
phase of the nation's antitrust policy could have been accomplished more effec-
tively by setting policies in another manner.
The FTC also enforces statutes containing a more limited legislative man-
date. These include the Wool, Fur, Flammable Fabrics, and Te.xtile Fiber
Products Identification Acts.'3 Rulernaking is feasible as a means for giving
specific content to these statutory prohibitions. And the Commission's exercise
of its rulemaling authority under these statutes has been timely and effective.
Before we leave the assessment of the Commission's performance of its
policymaking role, mention should the made of the Trade Practice Conference
device employed by the Commission. The Trade Practice Conference does not
formulate "rules" in the sense that term is employed in the Administrative
Procedure Act'I4 But the Conference is a valuable tool in policymaking in that
it provides useful guides to businessmen within a particular industry in obey-
ing the statutory proscriptions that the Commission enforces. In recent years
the Commission has also issued guides,'3 which are direct and informative
statements useful to those wishing to comply with the law. These guides are
a further indication of the Commission's effort to encourage voluntary com-
pliance by businessmen without resort to adjudicatory proceedings.
IV
The "new critics" next charge that administrative agencies deprive parties
to adjudicated cases of basic expectations to which they are entitled. Mr.
Hector has stated two expectations as the basis of his criticism. They are (1)
"that adjudicated cases will be decided on the basis of general principles and
standards known to the parties and applicable to all cases"; and (2) "that the
12. -38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).
-13. Wool Products Labeling Act of 4939, 54 Stat. 1128, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6-68j (1958);
Fur Products Labeling Act, 65 Stat. 175 (1951), 15 U.S.C. §§ 69-69j (1958) ; Flammable
Fabrics Act, 67 Stat. ll (1953), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1200 (1958); Textile Fiber Prod-
ucts Identification Act, 72 Stat. 1717, 15 U.S.C. §§ 70-70k (1958).
14. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958).
15. See FTC, Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 2 TRAE REG. REP. ff 5095A95 (19538):
FTC, Tire Advertising Guides, 16 C.F.R. § 14.3 (Supp. 1959) ; FTC, Cigarette Adver-
tising Guides, 2 TRADE- RE. RE'. 1 5029.13, 5055.15,-5055.44, 5031.115, 5097.10 (1957).
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persons who decide adjudicated cases will do so on the basis of voluminous
testimony and arguments advanced .by the parties and this alone, and that they
will personally state the reasons for their decision."10 We may well quarrel
over the interpretation of this first expectation. If it means no more than that
the agency will give due regard to statutes, rules, prior court decisions, and
its own prior decisions, then I do not dispute its phrasing. However, the "new
critics" give this expectation a Pickwickian reading. They state that decision
on a case-iby-case basis rather than conformity to a general policy is undesir-
able, and that in order to satisfy this expectation the agency must enunciate
broad general policies and follow them in all factual situations rather than
developing principles on a case-by-case basis.
I cannot subscribe to the notion that a policy is legitimate only if it is an-
nounced in general terms. To say that a black-letter rule announced prospec-
tively is always to be preferred to the development of a principle through
constant testing and reexamination in litigated cases is to cast aside the teach-
ings of the whole history of Anglo-American jurisprudence. The most prom-
inent aspect of our heritage has 'been the development of tempered, tested
principles through accretion in the context of individual cases. No party has
an inalienable right to have 'his conduct tested solely by black-letter rules. The
law must continuously be applied in novel situations. Any party to an ad-
judicatory proceeding may -be represented by counsel, and any lawyer worth
his salt knows -how to extract governing principles from statements in decided
cases and also 'how to use decided cases to make a reasoned estimate of the
probable outcome if the question is one of first impression. Indeed, this is one
of the basic skills of a lawyer; from the first day in law school we strive to
develop this skill. The "new critics" ignore the existence of this skill. In the
long 'history of the FTC a large body of precedent has accumulated. Those
precedents are as susceptible of analysis and restatement as any others.
The second expectation upon which Mr. Hector bases 'his criticism is that
commissioners will decide on the basis of the record and will explain the rea-
sons for their decisions. The FTC satisfies this expectation.
Federal Trade 'Commissioners explain their votes in reasoned opinions. An
opinion is issued in every case requiring explanation, whether it results in a
cease-and-desist order or a dismissal. We do 'not contend that the quality of
our opinions .has been uniformly high, but we are constantly striving to im-
prove them. The preparation of each opinion, save for a very few per curiani
decisions, is the individual responsibility of a particular commissioner. The
individual commissioner thus 'has ,the same opportunity a judge has to develop
pride in 'his craftsmanship. The vigor of individual dissents filed in past cases
shows how seriously this duty is discharged. The commissioners do not merely
rubber stamp the work of an anonymous professional staff of opinion writers.
FTC decisions are never announced prior to the publication of a supporting
opinion. The final vote in any case is never taken until the Commission has
16. Hector, supra note 6, at 939.
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before it a draft opinion submitted by the commissioner assigned to that task.
The commissioner-writer assigned to support the majority view after a ten-
tative vote at the close of oral argument or following a later conference with
his colleagues may report that' his close personal examination of the record
and -his reasoning processes have led him to join the minority.
The FTC constantly strives to develop an elite group of hearing examiners
and it gives due weight to their conclusions in any adjudicated case. The Com-
mission gives particular attention to the decision of the hearing examiner in
matters involving questions of credibility or choices between conflicting in-
ferences, where the examiner's close personal observation is invaluable.
We think that the FTC has satisfied, in the main, the two basic expectations
as phrased by Mr. Hector. But we are not content to rest upon the status quo.
We are constantly striving to improve our procedures. One of my constant
efforts 'has been to increase the stature of the hearing examiner. 17 If this task
can be accomplished, then the delay that plagues administrative proceedings,
just as it plagues judicial proceedings, may be reduced. Indeed, we at the FTC
are engaged in a continuous search for methods that may be of use in elimi-
nating delay. Increased use of pretrial-conference techniques and increased
reliance upon the stipulation technique may be two means to this end. I again
extend an invitation to practitioners and the organized bar to aid us in this
vital undertaking. The administrative agencies need the same sort of devoted
study and constructive criticism the bar has given to the courts.
V
The "new critics" have also charged that the administrative agencies have
failed to coordinate policies with other organs of government concerned with
the same problems. We may ask then whether the FTC has failed to coor-
dinate its policies and undertakings with other agencies charged with enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws. The answer to this question must be "No." The
Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have long
maintained a close and continuous liaison on all antitrust matters. There is a
continuous interchange of information as to prospective actions to the end
that any and all overlapping may be avoided. The success of this effort is re-
flected in the recommendation of the Attorney General's Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws that the dual enforcement of the antitrust laws be con-
tinued.' 8
17. I am convinced that the selection ot responsible, highly qualified hearing ex-
amineis of judkii tem'peram .tn plus- ekteriding to them a proper measure of judicial
discretion, will do more than anything else io improve the federal administrative process
and guard its integrity. See U.S. Comm. on Hearing Officers, President's Conference on
Administrative Procedure (Earl W,. Kintner, Chairman), Draft Report-Appointment
and Status of Federal Hearing Officers, 1954; U.S. PamisNxr's Co-,rzzxc o.,. AD-
XlmssRA=nv PRocm)bnz, REPORT 9-11, 57-63 (1953).
18. ATZr'Y Gmx. NATL Comm. ANTIRgUST REP. 375 (1955).
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The continuing effort to avoid overlapping and wasteful activity is also
exemplified by the FTC's formal negotiations with other agencies charged
with trade regulation. For example, in 1954 the Commission entered into an
agreement 19 with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare defining
spheres of activity in the enforcement of sections 12-15 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
20
Coordination has also been effected by means of recommendations for legis-
lation. The 1958 amendment of the Packers and Stockyards Act and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act to clarify responsibility for supervision of non-
meat-packing activities of the packing companies is an example of the use of
this means for coordination.21
These examples show that an independent agency can exploit means of co-
ordination on its own initiative. Congress is another, perhaps the most im-
portant, coordinator of administrative agency effort. Congress often establishes
important lines of demarcation by statute, but its role does not end there, Its
investigations and informed staff studies and its questions to the agencies often
isolate an area of conflict or overlap and provide the needed stimulus for a
solution.2
The "new critics" ignore the existence of these two means of coordination,
or at best minimize their effectiveness. They insist that the only way to insure
continuous coordination is to transfer the policymaking functions of the ad-
ministrative agencies to the Executive Branch. But is this a cure-all? Our
history is replete with epic conflicts between executive departments. The only
way these conflicts can 'be resolved within the Executive is to thrust yet an-
other burden on an already cruelly overburdened President, who has a thou-
sand other problems competing for his attention. Coordination may diminish,
not increase, under such a "solution."
The best way to achieve coordination of effort, if it be needed, is to provide
plural sources of initiative. These now exist. At one time an agency may take
the lead, at another the Congress, at still another the Executive. Such a plural
19. Working Agreement Between FTC and Food and Drug Administration, 2 TaLAD
RFG. REP. 1 8540 (1954).
Liaison has also been established between the FTC and the FCC on matters relating
to the dissemination of deceptive advertising by radio and TV broadcast. 22 Fed. Reg.
2318 (1957) ; 2 TVA.E REG. REP. ff 8541 (1957).
20. Federal Trade Commission Act, 52 Stat. 1:11 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-55 (1958);
Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§
301-92 (1958).
21. 72 Stat. 1749, 7 U.S.C. §§ 192, 227 (1958).
22. The current studies of the House Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight
and the establishment by that committee of the Advisory Council on Administrative Prob-
lems are excellent examples of the use by Congress of means of coordination other than
legislation. See Address of Hon. Oren Harris, Fdcus and Action, on Administratve Prob-
leyns-Mission of the Subcommittee o Legislative Oversight, Before the Public Utility
Law Section, ABA, Miami, Florida, Aug. 25, 1959 (mimeographed); House Subconun.
on Legislative Oversight, Investigation of Regulatory Commissions and Agencies, H.R.
REP. No. 1258, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 59 (1960).
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system exploits individual talents and energies wherever they may be found.
To be sure, such a plural system lacks the neat lines of control and tables of
organization that so gladden the heart of the technocrat. But this nation is a
democracy, not a technocracy. Throughout our history we have been wiling
to sacrifice theoretical neatness for practical accommodation.
On a more basic level it is possible to argue that there can be too much
coordination. The founding fathers recognized this in establishing the triune
separation of powers that the old critics of the administrative process relied
upon so 'heavily. I leave this question with you: Is it not possible that Con-
gress, by dividing some responsibilities among administrative agencies, may
well -have felt that the national good might best be achieved 'by separate accom-
plishments along diverse lines? m
VI
Finally, the "new critics" contend that the lot of a commissioner, like that
of a policeman, is not a happy one. They maintain that the imposition of
basically incompatible duties, the involvement with minor matters of adminis-
tration and personnel, and the lack of opportunity to develop true expertise
makes for rapid disaffection with the role of a commissioner. Let us examine
each of these contentions as they relate to the FTC. First, are the functions
of the FTC basically incompatible? Again the answer must be "No." We have
often heard that a man cannot continuously alternate between policynaking
and adjudication and perform either of these roles effectively. But this point
loses most of its effectiveness when an attempt is made to apply it to the work
of Federal Trade Commissioners. Our principal role in policymaking is per-
formed by applying broad statutes to individual cases. Little, if any, conflict
is present when policy is made in this manner.
23. A Senate committee rejected recommendations of the First Hoover Commission
that certain "executive" functions of the regulatory agencies be transferred to executive
departments with this comment:
To the extent that such recommendations were consistent with established legisla-
tive policies and in conformity with the separation of regulatory functions from ad-
ministrative controls of policy-determining departments or agencies, they received
favorable action. These regulatory commissions were established primarily by
the Congress to act on an independent basis in the public interest, and free from
direct control by the President over either their activities or their decisions. The
basic statutes provided that they be primarily responsible to the Congress of the
United States as the elected representatives of the people in order that they might
be responsive to the general public interest and in a position to carry on their
activities without improper influences from other governmental agencies. This
committee, and the Senate, determined therefore that favorable action on these
proposals would seriously impair the operations of these commissions and would
tend to undermine their independence of action.
Senate Comm. on Government Operations, Senate Action on Hoover Commission Re-
pdrts, S. REP. No. 4, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1953).
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A careful distinction must -be drawn 'between the work of the commissioners
and the work of the 'Commission as a corporate entity. A careful study of the
work of the Commission would also emphasize the basic continuity of its
functions. For instance, the existence of the power to issue cease-and-desist
orders assists the Commission in securing the closing of cases 'by voluntary
compliance after investigation, by stipulations, and 'by consent orders after a
complaint is issued.24 Because of 'the presence of this power, the Commission
often is able to dispose of complaints without resort to extended litigation. If
these functions were separated, then all would suffer a loss of effectiveness.
The contention that prosecutory and adjudicatory functions should not be
lodged in the same agency has been well ventilated. Even the sternest critics
of the administrative process have recognized that the adoption of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act 25 and internal reforms by the agencies have elim-
inated most objections. The FTC has been a leader in voluntary adherence to
the spirit of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Commission's staff has
been reorganized so that investigative, prosecutory, and adjudicatory functions
have been separated on horizontal lines.20 All the Commission's investigations
are handled by the Bureau of Investigation with its own director and all
prosecutory functions are handled by the Bureau of Litigation, also with its
own director. The commissioners have no connection with the prosecution of
cases other than their voting on whether a complaint should issue. And this
act in no way indicates a prejudgment on the merits. Rather, it resembles the
action of a court in passing upon a demurrer or a petition for certiorari.
We must next ask whether the commissioners are so involved with minor
matters of administration and personnel that they lack sufficient time for major
questions of policy and serious adjudicative matters. Again the answer must
'be "No." Coordination and direction come from the administrative staff
headed by the Executive Director and not from individual commissioners.
Most of the time of the commissioners is spent in preparation of opinions, in
determining whether stipulations or consent orders should be approved, and
in deciding whether complaints should issue. These tasks can hardly be called
minor administrative matters.
The "new critics" say that the turnover in members of the administrative
agencies has been too rapid to allow the development of a sufficient degree of
expertness. This has not been our experience at the Commission. Within
24. The FTC disposed of 493 matters in fiscal 1959; 148 cases were terminated by
stipulations accepted by the Commission without the issuance of a complaint; 298 were
terminated by consent order after a complaint was issued; 40 cases were terminated by
a final order after a full hearing.
Since 1914 the Commission has issued 5,772 orders to cease and desist, but in recent
years a large number of these have been consent orders. Since 1925, when the first stipu-
lation was accepted, the Commission has issued 9,255 stipulations. (Figures as of Decem-
ber 31, 1959.)
25. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958).
26. For a full account of the Commission's reorganization, see Kintner, The Revital-
ized Federal Trade Commission: A Two-Year Evahation, 30 N.Y.U.L. RFv. 1143 (1955).
[ Vol. 69: 965
KINTNER REPLY
recent years we have had commissioners whose service extends as long as
twenty-two years27 The service of the four incumbent commissioners other
than myself averages four years.2 Commissioner Tait, who has served on the
Commission for three years, had staff experience at the Securities and Ex-
change Commission before his appointment as a commissioner. Commissioner
Anderson, a former attorney general and Governor of South Dakota, has
served on the Commission for four years, and was recently reappointed for a
further seven-year term. Commissioner Secrest has served on the Commission
for five years. His government experience prior to appointment included six-
teen years in Congress. And if we are adding the sum total of the Commis-
sion's expertness we surely must include experience gained by commissioners
while serving on the Commission's own staff. Commissioner Kern, who has
served on the Commission for four years, gained extensive experience in anti-
monopoly work during his fourteen years on the staff prior to his appoint-
ment to the Commission. My service as Chairman dates only from June of
this year. However, it was my privilege to serve on the staff as Senior Trial
Attorney, as Attorney-Adviser to a member of the Commission, and as Gen-
eral Counsel for almost six years prior to my appointment to the Commission.
Finally, in assessing the expertness of an agency it is also important to ex-
amine the qualifications of the staff as well as those of the commissioners. At
the FTC our devoted staff has acquired several thousand man-years of ex-
perience, which is constantly available to the commissioners.
VII
The specific criticisms that we have been considering do not constitute an
exhaustive list. Critics old and new have raised many others and doubtless will
raise many more. However, an examination of a few representative criticisms
shows the need for careful questioning of unstated assumptions, and for patient
study and careful analysis before actions are taken which may disrupt the
entire regulatory process, terminate present benefits, and give birth to un-
known evils. Administrative law, like all law, must gradually work itself pure.
Only if the members of the commissions, their staffs, and the members of the
bar cooperate in careful and clear-headed examination can real improvement
be achieved.
27. For a tabulation of the service of all Federal Trade Commissioners in the period
1915-1958, see 1958 FTC 'ANX. REP. 80.
28. Ibid.
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